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Introduction to the problem complexity
The natural water mostly used in the South Asian region comes from the Ganges– Brah-
maputra–Meghna (GBM)1 river basin. The four South Asian countries Bangladesh, Nepal, 
India and Bhutan are sharing the largest river basin of the world together. China is also 
part of this GBM delta, nevertheless, it only shares the Brahmaputra along with Bhutan, 
India and Bangladesh (see Table 1 and Fig. 1). These three major rivers play a significant 
role in shaping the social and cultural lives of the people of this region. Many rivers in this 
region are originated in one country and end in another because of the artificial demarca-
tion that took place during the period of decolonization in the mid-twentieth century.
Water is one of the most important natural resources for the people living of the basin 
countries. About 80 per cent of the water in the Ganges flows in the monsoon months 
1 The Ganges–Brahmaputra-Meghna basin comprises of a river system that spans over 1.758 million square km (Dinar 
et al. 2007).
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(June–September) and very little during the dry season (October–May) (Mirza and 
Ahmed 2005). However, the region is facing shortage of fresh water as a result of high 
population growth, increased economic development and atmospheric hostility. The sit-
uation poses threats both to water as an environmental resource and a means of survival 
for about 451 million people dependent on the basin, directly or indirectly (Mirza and 
Ahmed 2005). As the demand of water increases, the countries sharing the basin are 
more concerned of fulfilling the internal demand, which leads countries to divert water 
unilaterally from the river basin without following the existing bilateral agreements 
between the countries.
The GBM river basin governance is still underdeveloped in South Asia. The region sig-
nificantly bears some potential threats of internal and inter-state conflicts that can desta-
bilize the coherence of the region. Considering the political context of the region, the 
paper argues that the water scarcity and ecological integrity in the basin can only be bet-
ter resolved by a multilateral cooperation framework among the GBM river basin coun-
tries. Based on this argument, the study deals with the question—what conditions can 
facilitate GBM based water governance among four main riparian countries (upstream 
and downstream) in resolving the water scarcity challenges in the region? Therefore, the 
study intends to find out the condition for a potential phenomenon (i.e. environmen-
tal cooperation within GBM) and explores the strategy that can help in establishing a 
regional cooperation framework.
The study adopts Rittberger et  al. (2006) ‘condition triangle’ explanatory model in 
developing a multilateral organizational framework in a regional context to answer the 
research question. The explanatory model shows how an institutional body can emerge 
as a product of interactions of the three conditions (problem, cognitive and hegemonic), 
as a consequence, and not necessarily due to a deliberate phenomenon. The study applies 
process tracing2 approach to explore the possibilities of a multilateral environmental 
cooperation under the regional context. The approach has comprehensively examined 
different narratives as a form of a chronicle that purports to throw light on how an event 
comes about (George and Bennett 2004). It deals with issues of interaction among the 
government, multilateral and non-government bodies, investigates the causal relations 
between the different units of analysis (states and civil society actors in GBM basin) and 
establishes the relationship between dependent and independent variables of the study. 
The dependent variables of the study are components related to the study objectives, 
issues like the possibility of a regional organization, the role of regional geo-political 
reality and the role of transnational environmental problem as an issue of regional coop-
eration. Besides, the independent variables of the study are the factors (three conditions) 
that have direct impacts on the dependent variables and help to establish causal connec-
tion with the dependent variables. The similarity that enforces the study to adopt this 
method is that both the study and process tracing method seek to construct a phenome-
non (regional cooperation on GBM) by testing an empirical model and by analyzing the 
historical chronicle of different explanations. The research primarily relies on primary 
2 According to George and Bennett (2004, 177), “Process tracing method is an indispensable tool for theory testing and 
theory development not only because it generates numerous observations with a case, but because these observations 
must be linked in particular ways to constitute an explanation of the case”.
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and secondary sources of information that include—academic journals, books, public 
statements, news reports, news articles, treaties related to environmental cooperation or 
environmental regionalism or regional cooperation.
While Rittberger, Zangle and Staisch’s use their analysis in order to explain the devel-
opment of international organizations, they also indentifies some organizations like EU, 
African Union as products of the three conditions, those are regional in nature. How-
ever, this study modestly engineers the three conditions as a deliberate policy tool to 
stimulate the contextual specificity of the GBM basin. The analysis in this article high-
lights how an integrated multilateral water governance mechanism in the GBM region 
generates the demand for enhanced information sharing, technical supports from the 
international donors, and convergence of the governments and civil society groups in 
the programmatic ventures. The empowerment of an inclusive cognitive community—a 
diverse body of think-tanks, NGOs, media, and the government and non-government 
experts—with financial and technical supports from the respective governments and 
international donors is a key contribution of this analysis. They are also well positioned 
to work with local communities of the basin. Further, a strong and inclusive cognitive 
community, despite its discontents, could exploit the hegemonic potentials of India and 
China in enhancing a multilateral cooperation among all the riparian countries in the 
basin area.
To continue further analysis, the first part of study unfolds the discussion of power 
politics and its impact on the environmental cooperation in a regional context. The sec-
ond part of the study elaborates on (“Multilateral governance policies and frameworks 
on joint river water sharing: South Asia and beyond”) the current state of regional 
cooperation in river water sharing and other broader areas of environmental issues in 
South Asia. Further, it demonstrates some ongoing state-led and civil society initiated 
approaches among the concerned countries of the region. In the third part, this study 
unpacks (“Regional cooperation on river water governance and a potential framework 
for GBM basin”) Rittberger et al.’s (2006) model and elaborates the analytical framework 
with the primary information on critical issues of transboundary river water in South 
Asia. Finally, the study concludes with the significance of a potential coherent multilat-
eral approach in the region for a better management of the GBM water basin.
Hydro‑political dynamics and geo‑political importance of GBM river basin
The geographical setting of south Asian countries is one of the major sources of the con-
tentious relations among them on water issue. According to the Basin at Risk (BAR)3 
scale values and friendship-hostility index by country region, the Ganges basin is more 
popularly known because of its 50  years long history of disputes and negotiation. In 
addition to the complex geographical settings of countries, a long history of antagonistic 
relations and power imbalances between the countries have resulted in further conflicts 
between the riparian countries (Yoffe et al. 2003).
Being an upper riparian country, the water endowment in Nepal and Bhutan largely 
represent a source of hydroelectric power, both for consumption and for earning rev-
enues through export of energy (Iyer 1999). The water resources in India, embodying 
3 BAR Water Event Database compiled all reported instances of conflict or cooperation over international freshwater 
resources in the world from 1948 to 1999.
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hydroelectric power, navigation and irrigation, have however been exposed to the dan-
gers of floods. On the other hand, the network of rivers represents a source of devas-
tating floods for Bangladesh, serves for irrigation, sustains fisheries and plays a role of 
controlling water salinity. People living in this basin have been making good use of fertile 
soil for the cultivation of various types of crops and for fishing.
There are different socio-economic and political realities of the four riparian countries. 
Being an upper riparian country, Nepal contributes 5 per cent of the long term average 
annual flow of the Ganges and 70 per cent of the flow during the dry season (Upreti 
2006). Nepal is a landlocked country between China and India. Therefore, it is heav-
ily dependent on India for trade and transit to get sea access through India. The pop-
ulation of the country highly depends on agriculture and natural resources. For India, 
the Ganges is known as ‘Mother Ganga’ and about 47 per cent of its population lives 
in the Ganges basin (Shahjahan and Harvey 2012). India is currently the third largest 
energy consumer in the world and water is vital for its economic growth. Bangladesh 
is at the downstream end of the basin and more than 80 per cent of the country lies 
within the basin (Gupta 2008; Shahjahan and Harvey 2012). Bangladesh’s agriculture 
largely depends on the water supply from the basin. It is also expected to rely heavily 
on its water resources to meet food demands and energy needs of a rapidly expanding 
population.
Most of the water generated in the GBM basins drain into the Bay of Bengal through 
Bangladesh. Over 75  % of the total volume of water annually drained by Bangladesh 
enters the country from upstream India. Bangladesh and India share nearly fifty-four 
rivers including the Ganges and Brahmaputra and disputes over water sharing of those 
rivers has been continuing for more than half a century. The origin of the disputes lied in 
the history when India constructed the Farakka barrage in 1961 on the Ganges. Despite 
the protest of the then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), Farakka was designed to divert 
water from the Ganges southward to the Hughly River primarily to navigate the Calcutta 
Port. The downstream effects of the barrage obstruct the agro-ecological and well-being 
of southern Bangladesh (Ahmed and Roy 2007; Condon et  al. 2009). Moreover, India 
claimed diversion is necessary for India’s national interest to meet its water demand and 
blamed Bangladesh of being unreasonable (Ahmed and Roy 2007). The negotiation pro-
cess of sharing water has been continued until the signing of the Ganges treaty in 1996 
(Wolf and Newton 2007). Even today, the Farakka barrage looms large in the minds of 
many Bangladeshis, fairly or not, as the single most conspicuous symbol of their big-
ger neighbors ‘bullying’ tactics and indifference to lower-riparian water needs (Wirsing 
2007).
Teesta,4 the decade long contention of India and Bangladesh, is absent from any agree-
ments settling the matter of water entitlement. It flows from the southern part of the 
Himalayan headwater, first through Indian lands and then crossed the border to Bangla-
desh until it joins the Brahmaputra River. Both Bangladesh and India have constructed 
the Teesta barrage.5 Tipaimukh dam is another disputer persists between the two coun-
tries. Massive protest against both the dam and river linking project took place in Bang-
ladesh and India due to the expected consequence over ecological future of the region.
4 A cross-boundary river between India and Bangladesh.
5 Teesta barrage is situated 20 km south of the Indian border.
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Nepal is the upper riparian country for four major rivers (Mahakhali, Karnali, Gan-
dak and Kosi) and regulation of these rivers has been an important issue for both India 
and Nepal. There are significant disagreements between the India and Nepal on what 
would be the equal sharing principles implied on the joint boundary rivers (Iyer 1990). 
Mohakhali is a boundary river, Nepalese drew the inference that it should belong equally 
to these two countries, and therefore, half of the water belongs to Nepal. The Indian view 
is that there is no warranty for drawing this kind of inference; that the river can be used 
by the two countries but does not belong to either (Iyer 1999). Apart from the owner-
ship of the river water, the border obstructions and embankments along the border have 
affected relations across border communities in Nepal (Swain, 2002). Indo-Nepal rela-
tions were also affected by large scale migration of people to Indian territories due to 
large scale floods in Nepal.
Indian river-linking project6 emerges as a potential threat to the whole region. The 
implementation of the project will have a negative impact on the scarce dry seasonal 
flow of the Ganges, which will have serious ecological threat to downstream country, 
Bangladesh (Ahmed and Ahmed 2004). Bangladesh needs water from the basin in the 
dry season to protect world’s largest mangrove wetland ecosystem in the Sundarbans. 
The river linking project has also been very expensive for Nepal, as it has to bear 50 per 
cent of the expenses for construction of storage dams within its territory (Ahmed and 
Ahmed 2004).
Moreover, China has consistently been showing its interest in the Brahmaputra to 
meet its increasing demands for fresh water and hydropower. The Brahmaputra has 
huge potential for hydropower generation for both China and India. China has more 
than 22,000 hydroelectric dams that supplies hydroelectricity to its giant production 
and consumption sectors and is considered as the world’s most aggressive dam builder 
(Nowshin 2015). China has aimed to divert water from its surplus southern region to the 
water-scarce regions in the north. The Brahmaputra is on high stake so far as this water 
diversion process is concerned and any such attempts of diversion of the Brahmaputra 
waters will likely produce undue consequences for the lower riparian countries—India 
and Bangladesh. According to the report, China will divert 200 billion cubic meters of 
Brahmaputra water as a continuation of third phase of its grand SNWDP project (Shah-
jahan and Harvey 2012). Iyer reflects the Indian perspective by saying that China’s con-
trol of the water supply downstream could affect aquatic life and displace populations 
living in the region (Nowshin 2015). Therefore, the diversion will provide China a firm 
control of the water flow of the Brahmaputra and leave India and Bangladesh in a scarce 
situation. All these issues are not merely bilateral and have strong probabilities to gener-
ate protracted regional disputes and controversies over the shared water resources.
Multilateral governance policies and frameworks on joint river water sharing: South Asia 
and beyond
The existing resource sharing arrangements are majorly bilateral in nature and are 
mostly governed by the geo-strategic thinking of individual countries (Swain 2002). The 
6 The project aims to connect Barahmaputa and Teesta and transfer large scale of water from the Brahmaputra and Gan-
ges basin to eastern and southern rivers in India (Condon et al. 2009). The project targeted to transfer 1,74,271 million 
cubic meters mostly from Brahmaputra through the Ganges (Ahmed and Ahmed 2004).
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bilateral agreements are broadly constructed by only volumetric measures of water that 
each country can claim in different seasons (Rahaman 2009; Sneddon and Fox 2006). 
Besides, countries have generated less emphasis in exploring a workable solution within 
the basin which could incorporate a group of stakeholders within as well as outside of 
the states. Nonetheless, multilateral governance framework is significantly absent to 
manage the use of trans-boundary rivers and the basin ecosystem in South Asia. The 
big powers—India and China—have avoided international conventions. For example, 
both these countries have declined to be the signatories of the 1997 UN Convention on 
the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UNCIW). Only 
Bangladesh and Nepal are parties to this framework (Chintan 2011). The state of infor-
mational sharing among the regional neighbors in regard to the trans-boundary rivers 
is equally frustrating in South Asia. The existing bilateral agreements provide a frame-
work for cooperation, however, this is often structurally limited due to the state-centric 
nature of the cooperation and limited scope of the treaties to a particular river. An Asia 
Foundation Report (2015) summarizes that Bangladesh, India and Nepal have national 
policies and laws that encourage the disclosure of information regarding the shared riv-
ers, however, the absence of a multilateral framework impedes any proactive disclosures 
of water-related data and policies for further cooperation. On regional environmental 
cooperation, South Asian countries have minutely addressed the issues in the regional 
platform. SAARC devised a policy of regional cooperation in the energy sector. In 2014, 
the leaders of the SAARC signed a Framework Agreement on Energy Cooperation that 
aims to promote regional trade and cooperation in water, hydropower and disaster miti-
gation. In addition to this, the forum has also forwarded a few other regional frame-
works in this area.
In July 2008, the SAARC ministerial meeting on climate change at Dhaka asked for 
close regional cooperation in capacity building and also to raise awareness of climate 
change (Swain 2011). The SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change (2009–2011) identi-
fies seven thematic areas of cooperation related to: adaptation; mitigation; technology 
transfer; finance and investment; education and awareness; management of impacts and 
risks; and capacity building for international negotiations.7 Further, SAARC has taken a 
common position on climate change-related matters at the Conference of Parties (COP) 
15 Conference on Climate Change in Copenhagen on December 2009. However, a little 
has been achieved in establishing any concrete multilateral arrangements apart from 
meeting regularly and showing the desire of regional environmental cooperation. One of 
the major constraints of the SAARC, as one scholar has argued, is the state-centric 
nature of the organization (Rasul 2015). The exclusionary nature of the existing frame-
work of SAARC provokes a biased and unfruitful multilateral cooperation in any critical 
issues like the trans-boundary river water sharing. Without incorporating multilateral 
actors and representation of the people living in the basin as an active geopolitical agent, 
regional transboundary cooperation is hard to sustain in future (Sneddon and Fox 2006).
In addition to the SAARC-led initiatives, there are some significant demonstrations 
of cooperation at the state and the civil society levels. At the state level, the govern-
ments of Bangladesh, Nepal and India initiated preliminary discussions on a potential 
7 SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change, http://saarc-sdmc.nic.in/pdf/publications/climate/chapter-2.pdf.
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cooperation on hydropower sector. The 15 April 2013 issue of the Hindu reports that the 
Government of India (GoI) extends its cooperation towards Bangladesh and Nepal in 
the joint development of the Ganges basin (Mehdudia 2013). This sub-regional frame-
work, as observed by the GoI, has tremendous potentials for hydro-power, navigation, 
and environmental sectors and in the economy of the co-basin countries. Such transfor-
mation in India’s role could arguably be considered as an outcome of to counter China’s 
recent unilateral attempts to control the water resources of the Brahmaputra. Scholars 
have also observed that India expresses its intention to promote a multi-state coopera-
tion on the management of the Brahmaputra River and generate hydropower resources 
(Dhungel 2013). The initiative would consider Bhutan, India and Bangladesh in the 
Brahmaputra basin to devise a regional cooperative framework. Dhaka has shown inter-
ests to such regional initiatives, nonetheless, Nepal has been cautiously optimistic due to 
its vulnerable internal political situation (Dhungel 2013).
International donors have facilitated some vital collaboration on joint river water 
sharing issues. The Observer Research Foundation, Delhi and the Asia Foundation had 
started an initiative beyond South Asia, known as—Mekong-Ganga Dialogue (MGD), 
since 2012. The major aim is to create a knowledge-based network and broader sup-
port to the multilateral governance in Mekong-Ganga basin. This track II dialogue has 
promoted dialogues and exchange of information among the activists, experts and gov-
ernment officials from both the regions to devise plan of cooperation on issues of river 
water sharing, environmental conservation and food-water-energy issues (ORF 2014). 
The MGD also advocates the need of up-to-date data collected by the state on joint riv-
ers, and exchange of the data at the government-to-government and non-government-
government levels. The shared knowledge would enhance in establishing norms and 
protocols for a sustainable multilateral governance in the GBM basin.
In both the previous sections (“Multilateral governance policies and frameworks on 
joint river water sharing: South Asia and beyond” and “Regional cooperation on river 
water governance and a potential framework for GBM basin”), it is apparent that the 
regional geopolitics in South Asia and the interest factors of the two diametrically 
opposing hegemonies of China and India are the most critical issues that obstruct a mul-
tilateral framework in GBM water basin. Nonetheless, the basin-based cooperation in 
GBM has never really exploited the opportunities that could be generated due to a coop-
eration that goes beyond the inter-state levels. The minimal evidence of the environmen-
tal cooperation under the auspices of SAARC is an important example of such failure.
Regional cooperation on river water governance and a potential framework for GBM basin
This section examines the case of GBM based cooperation with the analytical frame-
work of Rittberger and his colleagues’ model of three conditions: Problem, Cognitive 
and Hegemonic conditions (Andreatta and Archibugi 2010), which are empirically used 
as a prerequisite for the emergence of an international organization. The study advocates 
for basin based cooperation that can address ecological alteration and resource degrada-
tion. Further, it addresses people’s desire, that depends on the shared river basin water 
and it would be able to expand mutual benefits through joint development programs in 
the basin. Since early 1990s, six countries8 within the Mekong River basin have grouped 
8 These countries are: China, Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.
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together with the assistance of transnational communities (e.g. Asian Development 
Bank) to facilitate multiple development forums in trans-boundary river cooperation. 
The following segments unfold the challenges and opportunities of a multilateral coop-
eration framework in the context of South Asian shared river water with the help of the 
framework suggested by Rittberger et al. (2006).
The main assumption of the empirical analysis is,
“International Organization emerges when complex interdependencies push states 
into international cooperation to further common interests (‘Problem condition’)….
not only on the mere fact of the existence of complex interdependencies themselves 
but also on the realization that these interdependencies lead to problems which can 
only be overcome through cooperation within international organizations (‘cognitive 
condition’)….and when a hegemonic state is willing to bear the costs of the creation 
of the organization(‘Hegemonic condition’)…we propose that international organi-
zations are created when each of the three conditions deriving from Institutionalist, 
the idealist and the realist traditions- are met at the same time” (Rittberger et al. 
2006, 25).
The paper argues that the conditions Rittberger et  al. (2006) have suggested already 
exist in the case of GBM water governance(see Fig. 2). It is timely to realize the urgency 
for a series of collaboration among all the countries (China, India, Nepal, Bhutan and 
Bangladesh) connected by the GBM river basin. The connectivity in between the differ-
ent conditions of the model offers an integrated resource management and development 
approach that will improve the existing stagnation and enhance environmental, econom-
ical and social development of the basin. The following part elaborates the features of 
three conditions and how it can play a role towards basin based multilateral cooperation.
Problem condition
The problem condition emphasizes complex interdependencies among states that lead to 
further cooperation. This idea is derived from the ‘Institutionalist’ school that advocates 
for interest constellation to a specific issue within a certain group of countries before 
they proceed for further cooperation. Once the actors find out the common interest that 
expected benefits are higher than expected costs, only then the actors have an incentive 
for regional cooperation (Rittberger et al. 2006).
The growing demand of water for domestic uses, industrial use in the region is also 
expected to increase (see Table 2 and Table 3). For example, India’s water demand for 
its domestic, agriculture and industrial sector is expected to be double from 890 mil-
lion cubic meters in 2006 to 1.4 trillion in 2050 (Wirsing 2007). While the demand of 
water is mounting in the GBM basin, the supply of water flow is decreasing gradually. 
The research estimates that India and Bangladesh will have shortfall of water about 70 
and 60 % respectively (Condon et al. 2009, 32–33).
Water demand in India requires more diversion of water stream and dam construction 
on its rivers, including the Ganges. Such activities are likely to be caused more stress on 
the already tense situation between India and its neighboring states over water resources. 
A potential impact of loosing livelihood option is internal displacement or cross border 
forced migration. In such cases of forced population movement, both India and 
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Bangladesh are affected. India, as a neighboring country, is one of the easiest destination 
countries for Bangladeshis. India is already overly populated and such migration has its 
own socio-economic and security consequences for India.9 On the other hand, the con-
struction of Sapta Koshi High Dam10 in the Nepalese side of the Indo-Nepal border area, 
despite facing constant objection from the local people, brought negative externalities 
for Nepal. The construction of dam affected more than 2600 houses and a population of 
more than 15,174 (Rotberg and Swain 2007).
Discontinuity in sustainable water supply is another major problem for the riparian 
countries. The lack of steady water supply in the dry seasons provokes these states to 
build large water storage dam to conserve monsoon water. Nonetheless, it generates 
negative consequences for other regional neighbors. In between Bangladesh and India, 
such tensions will add with the ongoing longstanding conflicting issues—diversion of 
water by the Farakka and Teesta barrages, Tipaimukh dam and future river linking pro-
ject. Furthermore, China’s recent interest on controlling the Brahmaputra will add more 
complications to the existing contentious relationship between Bangladesh and India. 
The possible Chinese diversion of water will reduce the water flow of the Brahmaputra 
to India and Bangladesh. Therefore, the possibility of environment induced migration 
will likely increase that exacerbates tension further by destabilizing India. India is also 
facing internal disputes over the ownership of the basin water. For example, Karnataka 
has conflicts with Andhra Pradesh with regard to sharing the waters of the Krishna River 
(Verghese 1997). The underline reason of the conflict is Karnataka’s decision to install 
gates on the Alamati dam in the upper catchment of the river in order to enhance the 
power generation (Verghese 1997). Moreover, a new plan to divert river water by China 
will further exacerbate the tension among China, Bangladesh and India.
The GBM basin has a huge potential for hydropower project which is also a conten-
tious issue for the region. All the riparian countries are primarily interested in hydro-
power for minimizing increased demands of electricity for domestic use, for irrigation, 
for flood regulation and for energy security. Energy is vital for India’s high economic 
growth. In order to sustain its growth, India may plan and China may keep planning to 
secure access to new sources of energy. In competing with China, India may also move 
forward for an expansion of hydropower generation, which will ultimately impose pres-
sure on the already scarce water resources. Although, there is no appropriate data on 
the energy demand in Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan, but these countries are already 
having huge electricity deficit and are potential to generate hydropower. Nepal and Bhu-
tan, being an upper riparian, have strong interest for the hydropower development since 
they have huge potentiality for this. Both Nepal and Bhutan lack the capital and technol-
ogy required for such large projects and also needs a buyer for the surplus hydropower. 
Although Nepal has some water resource development projects (i.e. waters of the Sarada 
(1920), the Kosi (1954), and the Gandak (1959) with India, Nepalese always felt discrimi-
nated because of their bi-lateral nature of the project (Upreti 1993). Besides with Nepal, 
Bhutan has also a bi-lateral agreement with India for hydropower development and flood 
9 As per 2001 census of India, there are 3,084,826 people in India who came from Bangladesh (source: http://censusin-
dia.gov.in/).
10 The ambitious multi-billion dollar project will combine irrigation facilities, a flood control system, power generation 
of 3000 MW, a 269-m waterway and construction of an 883 ft high concrete or rock-filled dam.
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forecasting network on rivers common to India and Bhutan. By incorporating China as 
upper riparian and Bangladesh as lower riparian in the process, Nepal and Bhutan may 
feel comfortable dealing with India in this case.With such realization and the quest for 
a combined solution, the countries will be able to install interests into action, which is 
important prior to initiate any regional cooperation (Rittberger et al. 2006).
Cognitive community
According to Rittberger et al. (2006), the presence of a cognitive community along with 
the problem situation can enhance cooperation between the concerned countries. The 
purpose of the cognitive society is to enable states to envisage the value of solving the 
problem together and will lobby for the specific perception. Being inspired by the Ideal-
ist school of thought, Rittberger et  al. (2006) justifies the argument with an empirical 
example of the formation of League of Nations, which was an outcome of conscious 
community of nations carried specific values and norms of the world peace. Unlike Ritt-
berger and his colleagues, some scholars emphasize such group as ‘epistemic commu-
nity’11 or ‘international community’,12 as significant actor for forwarding any progressive 
regional development agenda. There are also several successful examples of cognitive 
community that has been formed to work together for sustainable cooperation on 
regional development. One of such initiatives are taken by the academics from Iraq, 
Syria, Turkey and United States that has been emerged with an approach to promote 
sustainable cooperation on regional development called Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for 
Cooperation (ETIC) (Kibaroglu 2008).
National and trans-national NGOs are also playing effective roles in putting pressure 
on policy issues upon the governments and at the same time have impacts over the crea-
tion on public opinion in social issues. Concerning river water sharing problem, a few 
civil society organizations13 are working in India, Bangladesh and Nepal and are employ-
ing greater efforts to address the water problem. Nonetheless, their initiative lack a coor-
dinated approach and they are yet to develop a combined voice. Those initiatives have 
huge potential for deeper collaboration to show solidarity in the context of river water 
sharing, dams/s embankments/floods. In Manipur, Action against Tipaimukh (ACTIP) 
and the Citizens’ Concern for DAM and Development were formed and they had estab-
lished links with Angikar Bangladesh Foundation. Together, these organizations had 
protested against the construction of Tipaimukh dam in an international conference was 
11 Haas provides an articulated meaning of the idea of epistemic communities as ‘a network of professionals with rec-
ognized expertise and competence in a particular domain, who share a commitment to a common causal model and a 
common set of political values’ (Haas 1992, p. 3 and Haas 1990).
12 It is primarily composed of a network of elite actors (e.g., the global water industry, water research ‘think tanks’, rep-
resentatives of the UN system, government representatives, policy experts, and scientific advisors)—pushing a global 
water agenda reveals little about the socio ecological processes that delineate conflicts and transformations in specific 
basins (Giordana and Wolf 2003: Sneddon and Fox 2006).
13 Water Nepal Conservation Foundation (established in 1990) is involved in building knowledge, raising awareness and 
disseminating insights through innovative action carried out in partnership with its field partners (Singh 2008); Jalsrot 
Vikas Sanstha, (Nepal), works as the regional arm of the Global Water Partnership, and seeks to implement plans and 
programme on Integrated Regional Water Management (IRWM).; South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People 
(SANDRP) (established in India in 1998), is a network of people working on water issues mostly in India but also in 
some other parts of SA; South Asia Consortium for Interdisciplinary Water Resources Studies (SACIWATER) is based 
in India with focus on transforming water resources knowledge system by using an interdisciplinary approach from a 
pro-poor and human development perspective (Behra 2012); Bangladesh Poribesh Andolan (BAPA) is based in Bangla-
desh mainly working against India’s river linking project along with other national environmental problem; Bangladesh 
Unnayan Parishad (BUP) is focusing on the Ganges basin and advocating for regional cooperation; And, Bangladesh 
Unnayan Parishad (BUP) is focusing on the Ganges basin and advocating for regional cooperation.
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held in 2005. Moreover, International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development 
(ICIMOD) and its partners are working to provide credible information and knowledge 
through its different research programs, such as Regional Flood Information Systems 
(HKH-HYCOS) and Koshi basin program.
South Asian civil society organizations are identified as key catalysts of change in the 
field of poverty reduction, women issue, trade and commerce are visible. It creates hope 
to generate ideas of forming similar civil society movement in the areas of common river 
water sharing at the regional level. However, it is also important to consider the nature 
of the states in South Asia that apply despotic power to intervene into the spheres of 
the civil society as part of the state-led co-optation process. This is also reflected in the 
structure of the only regional organization, i.e. SAARC, which is state-centric in nature. 
SAARC has limitations to accommodate non-state bodies as part of the multilateral 
cooperation framework. In addition to this, NGOs and civil society in South Asia are 
dependent on external resources (Lewis 2011). Due to such external dependence, it is 
alleged that the epistemic community and civil society reflect the agenda of the funder. 
Despite such limitations, civil societies have emerged as a crucial actor and a parallel 
force to the government in most of the South Asian countries. The political reality is 
dominant despite the existence of these initiatives that might obstruct in the formation 
of a perceptional convergence among the actors on regional integrity to call for a multi-
lateral initiative in the river water sharing movement (Tables 1, 2, 3; Figs. 1, 2).    
Therefore, there is a high potential that a combined force of civil society and informed 
experts (i.e. epistemic community) and multilateral bodies (e.g. donors—ADB, WB) can 
form an effective cognitive community that aims to contribute in collecting and dissemi-
nating information among the countries to let the people and government understand 
the nature of the problem and advocate for workable solutions of the crisis. However, 
there is not enough perceptional convergence emerged yet among different actors on 
regional integrity in this region to call it as a combined regional movement. There is 
an urgent need to develop a cognitive group comprised of government officials, CSOs, 
NGOs, think-tanks, policy advocacy centers, which will take advocacy role to compel 
respective countries for searching a common solution for the collective good of the 
GBM basin. An inclusive cognitive condition does not exclude the role of government 
experts in such platforms. Moreover, donors should also facilitate government-civil 
society cooperation through advocating an inclusive cognitive community for river 
water management. Simultaneously, they will develop consciousness among different 
stakeholders of the community including the people who will ultimately advocate for a 
regional movement to promote a common value.
Hegemonic condition
Rittberger et  al. (2006) take the neo-realists conceptualization of hegemonic situation 
and recognizes it as a third condition for his analytical model. When the hegemonic 
power is willing to accept the relative gain of other states for the absolute gain of itself, 
cooperation strategies evolve (see also Kistin 2007; Zeitoun et al. 2008). The paper argues 
in favor of the leadership role of India as the hegemonic power in the context of estab-
lishing the ecological integrity of the GBM river basin. Nonetheless, the role of China is 
also critical to generate a combined hegemonic condition led by two giant nations of the 
Page 12 of 17Akter  Bandung J of Global South  (2016) 3:25 
Table 1 Catchment areas of the GBM basins
Source: Rangachari and Verghese (2001); Pun (2004)













China 33 3 293 50 – –
Nepal 140 13 – – – –
Bhutan – – 45 8 – –
India 861 80 195 34 49 58
Bangladesh 46 4 47 8 36 42
Table 2 India: projected water shortages
Source: Upreti (1993); Condon et al. (2009)
1995 2025 2050
Shortage, cubic kilometers −508.76 −646.09 −820.47
Deficit as percentage of total environmental water requirement 39.9 53.3 86.0
Table 3 Bangladesh: projected water shortages
Source: Condon (2009)
Year 1990 2000 2025 2050
Per-capita water for all of Bangladesh, in cubic meters 960 761 504 412
Shortage on Falkenmark Index −40 −239 −496 −588
Fig. 1 Water Basin Map in South Asia. The map is collected from: The New Horizon. Towards equitable water 
allocation in South Asia. https://horizonspeaks.wordpress.com/2009/06/17/towards-equitable-water-usage-
in-south-asia/
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world. The asymmetric inter-state relations between the GBM basin countries are criti-
cal in exploring hegemonic conditions for potential cooperation. The discrepancies are 
already been explained in the prior section of the paper. Such inter-state discrepancies 
is reflected when a state’s voice is projected in any policy matter and also determined by 
the behavioral patterns of states towards each other.
India is a hegemonic country in terms of size and power, in South Asia (Burki 2011; 
Dash 2008). The impact of being a hegemon is deep and also visible in the region, when 
it comes to water sharing negotiations with three other small riparian countries (Bangla-
desh, Nepal and Bhutan). India remained keen to establish the rights of the lower ripar-
ian, but when they dealt with Bangladesh the need of the upper riparian becomes more 
important (Shahjahan and Harvey 2012). India insisted on separate negotiations with 
each of the riparian countries to gain benefits from both the countries, although they are 
sharing the same basin. India’s separate approaches with Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan 
in dealing its water shortage explain India’s domination over the negotiation process and 
unwillingness for multilateral cooperation. The research on hegemonic trans-bound-
ary water arrangement shows that more powerful side had greater ability to shape the 
outcome (Zeitoun, Mirumachi and Warner 2010). However, country like South Africa, 
being a hegemon in the region, plays a role to play a leadership role with Lesotho and 
Namibia on the Orange-Senqu River (Turton and Funke 2008) and the development of 
larger framework of the Southern African Development Community is an example of an 
integrated approach where power is exercised (Kistin 2007).
In South Asia, Nepal and Bhutan’s hydroelectric potentiality can develop their econ-
omy further to fulfilling their internal demands and selling the produced energy to India 
and Bangladesh. The hydroelectricity transfer to India can contribute to India’s increas-
ing power demand for its rapid industrialization and population growth, especially in 
the development of its Northeastern areas. On the contrary, Nepal needs technical and 
financial supports for which they very much depend on India (Rotberg and Swain 2007). 
Such mutual beneficial arrangement was successful whereby United States paid Canada 
for the benefits of flood control and Canada was granted rights to divert water between 
the Columbia and Kootenai Rivers for hydro-power (Wolf 2007). If India, being the pow-
erful neighbor in the region, initiates regional governance on water sharing issues, India 
will potentially gain benefits along with the other three countries. More importantly, the 




COGNITIVE COMMUNITY PROBLEM CONDITION
Fig. 2 Three Conditions for multilateral governance in the GBM basin
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its longstanding image crisis in the region. India’s move from bilateral to multilateral 
cooperation has many positive implications in the region. Multilateral cooperation can 
also influence some pending bilateral initiatives positively, for example.
As mentioned earlier, China is an unavoidable force in the region with its critical geo-
political interests. China has already committed to invest approximately $1.5 billion to 
build a dam in Brahmaputra (Nowshin 2015). This has raised some serious concerns 
in India and Bangladesh. Nonetheless, China has ensured to move forward by utilizing 
its ideological position of so-called ‘soft-path’ cooperation and international diplomacy 
(Wouters and Chen 2013). China has been a major upstream state and a party to more 
than fifty bilateral and multilateral water sharing agreements. The country consumes 
the pressure of making a balance between usage and distribution of shared river water 
to some of the predominant downstream states—Russia and India. At the same time, 
India has also to bargain its share from the storage of water and hydroelectric projects in 
Nepal and Bhutan so that they agree to provide a significant downstream benefit (of irri-
gation, flood control, power as well as navigation and fishing) to India. Under the given 
circumstances, Both China and India may need to transform its bilateral approach to a 
multilateral one on the water sharing issues, especially in the case of the Brahmaputra. 
The whole region—more specifically the lower riparian states—can be benefited in the 
long run in this broader hegemonic condition in South Asia. For example, Nepal cannot 
exploit the advantage of its huge water resources potential for hydropower development 
in the absence of agreements with India and be able to a part of a multilateral framework 
that would ensure justice to all participant stakeholders.
Concluding remarks
Countries in the GBM basin region view water as an important resource that fulfils 
diversified demands of domestic water and energy needs. Crisis with water flows due 
to environmental and manmade degradations would have serious consequences on the 
people of the region and influence negative relations among neighbors. Several studies 
argued for coordinated Ganges basin management approach but the countries sharing 
the basin could promote social, economic and environmental well being for the whole 
region (Swain 1993; Swain 2002; Verghese 1999; Rahaman 2008). New kinds of regional 
agreements are desired among all the GBM riparian countries in order to attain the opti-
mum benefits of water resources for the common good of the whole region. Considering 
the troubled history of the region, the asymmetric relationship between the countries 
and level of mistrust, it is quite difficult to address the water shortage of whole region 
through bilateral arrangement. However, those bi-lateral initiatives offer plenty of com-
mon ground and a window of opportunity to foster coordinated and sustainable water 
resource development and management in the GBM basin region (Rahaman 2009). The 
study shows the possibility of multilateral governance framework in the region on river 
water sharing at the GBM basin through the analytical framework of Rittberger et  al. 
(2006). There have been attempts of regional cooperation in a few other environmental 
issues, however, the success lacks a coordination among the stakeholders on the three 
crucial conditions—problem, cognitive community, and hegemonic condition. The 
regional governance system at GBM river basin can be materialized if the problem of 
water scarcity and preserving of eco-system are considered as a regional interdependent 
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problem, thereby, only be resolved multilaterally at the regional levels. The second con-
cern is building of a cognitive community within the four riparian countries. The civil 
society groups have played influential roles behind bilateral cooperation on the 1996 
water sharing agreement between India and Bangladesh and in the 1997 treaty between 
India and Nepal. In addition, CSOs have actively supported in raising awareness to 
develop environmental policies in the internal context. Finally, in historical overview of 
SAARC’s limited success, and in the bilateral river water negotiation processes, the com-
mon factor is India’s hegemonic position. Nonetheless, it is also significant for China to 
effectively facilitate partnership in South Asia. Only by counterbalancing India’s hegem-
ony by China does not bring solution to the water scarcity and existing mistrust over the 
river water sharing arrangement. Rather, a positive leadership role of India and China 
by taking the lead, and sharing the cost of the cooperation might be the best alterna-
tive solution of the problem. Therefore, a proper utilization of a combined hegemonic 
attitude as a constructive leadership would bring practical benefits for all the riparian 
countries. This study constitutes an early attempt of applying this theoretical frame-
work—Rittberger et al.’s (2006) explanatory model for the development of international 
organizations—into an area of regional multilateral governance, precisely in river water 
sharing between GBM basin countries, hence, requires further in-depth investigation 
with broader scopes and opportunities.
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